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I. INTRODUCTION
"[P]harmaceuticals are the poster child for the patent system."
Richard A. Posner, Judge for the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals'
The pharmaceutical patent system has been hailed as a resounding success
and as a model for patent schemes in other markets, 2 So it might be surprising
to find out that this system is engaging in a practice that is potentially costing
consumers billions of dollars a year.3 The practice is called "reverse payment"
or "pay-for-delay" agreements. 4 Before introducing a generic drug, a company
typically must file a legal proceeding against the brand-name manufacturer.
This proceeding attempts to invalidate the drug's protective patents or show
that the generic version does not violate these patents.5 However, the recent
development of reverse payment deals involves the holder of a drug's patent,
typically a brand-name manufacturer, paying a generic drug company to refrain
from producing generic versions of that drug for a certain period of time. 6 The
deals are "reverse" in that the money flows from the patent holder to the
potential patent infringer. These deals have become increasingly common and
have been criticized by consumer groups as restraining trade and "delaying the
introduction of inexpensive generic drugs."'7
A split has recently developed in circuit courts regarding the legality of
reverse payment deals under antitrust laws. Recently, the Second, Eleventh, and
Federal Circuit Courts have held that these deals are legal as long as the
restriction on competition does not exceed the scope of the patent under the
so-called "scope-of-the-patent" test.8 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
1 Richard A. Posner, Why Their Are Too Many Patents in America, ATLANTic (July 12, 2012,
10:20 AI), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/07/why-there-are-too-many-pat
ents-in-america/259725/.
2 Id
3 J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, PharmaceuticalPatent Settlements and the
Supreme Court, in FED. TRADE COMMSSION 13 (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/ros
ch/120921cbipharmaspeech.pdf.
4Id.

Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., 'Pay for Delay" Settlements of Disputes Over Pharmaceutical
Patents,
NEW ENG.J. MED. 365:1439-45 (Oct. 13, 2011), availableat http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.10

56/NEJMhleI 102235.
6 Id. at 1439.
7 Id.
8 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2005); FTC v. Watson
Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.,
544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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on the other hand, has been adamantly against reverse payment deals, claiming
that they are restraints on trade.9 In a recent opinion, the Third Circuit held
that reverse payment deals are presumptively illegal, explicitly rejecting the
scope-of-the-patent test used by the Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuit
Courts.' 0 In response to this circuit split, on December 7, 2012 the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to Federal Trade Commission v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677
F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012) (Watson), a case that raises this very issue." The
Supreme Court has yet to issue an opinion on this case.12
Judge Richard Posner, who has become an authority on the American patent
system, claims that the pharmaceutical industry is somewhat unique in its need
for strong patent protection as the peculiarities of the industry reflect
3
underlying principles of patent law.' The three reasons he provides for this
opinion are: (1) the expensive nature of developing new drugs; (2) the patent
clock beginning to run when the patent is granted, even though pharmaceutical
companies still need to invest time in testing the drug before it can be marketed;
and (3) the cost of inventing a drug far outweighing the cost of producing a
drug, leaving little incentive to engage in the expensive process of developing a
new drug if copying were permitted.14
First, this Note will review the legal history, policy considerations, and
relevant statutes relating to patent protection in the pharmaceutical industry. It
will then provide the reasoning behind the Second Circuit's support of the
scope-of-the-patent test, as well as the Third Circuit's rejection of this test.
This Note concludes by proposing a simple modification to the scope-of-thepatent test which accounts for deals that could pose a restraint on trade and acts
as a viable compromise between the two positions.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to fully understand the difference between the Third Circuit's view
and that of the Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits regarding the legality of
reverse payment deals, it is necessary to delve into the historical development
and present implications of the conflict. First, this Note will review the legal

9

Kesselheim et al., supra note 5, at 1439.

10 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012).

11 Jillian Centanni, Supreme Court to Examine Pay-For-Delay Settlements, IPLAwALERT.COM (Dec.
17, 2012, 10:36 AM), http://www.iplawalert.com/2012/12/articles/patent-1/supreme-court-toexamine-payfordelay-settlements/.
12 Id.
13 Posner, supra note 1.
14 Id.
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history, policy considerations, and legislative purpose of patent protection in the
pharmaceutical industry. Second, it will address the relevant statutes concerning
patent protection in the pharmaceutical industry.
Patents are a form of intellectual property authorized by the U.S.
Constitution in Article I, Section Eight, which states, "Congress shall have
Power .. . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." 5
Patents provide patentees with "the right to exclude others from making,
using, offering for sale, or selling" inventions they have patented.16 Patents can
be granted for processes as well as tangible inventions.17 Generally, a patent
provides a twenty-year period of exclusivity to the patentee, starting from the
date on which the patent application was filed.I8
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), part of the
Department of Commerce, is the administrative body that is tasked with the
duty to evaluate and issue patents.' 9 The USPTO advises the President,
Security of Commerce, and other governmental agencies on patent-related
policies. 20
A. STATUTORY AND POLICY BACKGROUND FOR THE PATENT PROTECTION OF
PHARMACEUTICALS

The most important piece of legislation in the area of pharmaceutical patent
law is the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
commonly referred to as the Hatch-Waxman Act.21 The Hatch-Waxman Act
amended the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 22 and the Patent Act 23 and
has been credited with achieving a "sensitive balance between patent protection

15 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

1635 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012).
17

Id

18 Id. § 154(a)(2).

19 United States Patent and Trademark Office, THE USPTO: WHO WE ARE (Apr. 3, 2013),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/index.jsp.
20 Id
21 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Section 505(), 21 U.S.C. § 355();
Martha Rumore, The Hatch-Waveman Act--25 Years Later Keeping the PharmaceuticalScales Balanced,
PHARmACY TimES (Aug. 15, 2009), http://www.pharmacytimes.com/publications/supplement/
2009/GenericSupplementO809/Generic-HatchWaxman-0809; 21 U.S.C. § 355.
22 Rumore, supra note 21 (citing Food, Drug, Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, ch. 675, 52
Star. 1040 (June 25,1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 55301-399 (2002) at 355 (2006))).
2 35 U.S.C. %§1-376 (2012).
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and encouraging generic entry." 24 The Hatch-Waxman Act transformed the
generic drug market by allowing for more efficient administrative approval of
generic drugs.25 Prior to the Act, Federal Drug Administration (FDA) approval
of generic drugs required costly and duplicative clinical trials. The Act created
the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), which provides the
opportunity for generic drug manufacturers to obtain FDA approval by
providing proof that the active ingredient is biologically equivalent to the
ingredient the brand-name manufacturers use.26 The ANDA system requires
generic drug manufacturers to choose one of the available certification options:
they must either claim that no patent was filed for the drug (a paragraph I
certification), claim that the patent has expired for the drug (a'paragraph II
certification), claim that the patent will expire and guarantee that they will not
market the generic drug until the patents protecting the brand-name drug have
expired (a paragraph III certification), or seek certification through a
"Paragraph IV challenge," which either challenges the validity of the brandname manufacturer's patents or attempts to show that the generic drug does
not violate those patents. 27 A Paragraph IV challenge requires a generic drug
manufacturer to examine preexisting patents that have been registered with the
FDA, which can be a lengthy process. 28
A pharmaceutical drug is typically covered by multiple patents, including a
patent protecting the primary active ingredient and patents for more minor
characteristics, such as coating or different formulations of the primary
ingredient.29 These secondary patents can have the effect of lengthening the
protection of the covered drug, as the patents for active ingredients may expire
prior to these secondary patents. 30 As the primary patents expire, these
secondary patents prevent generic manufacturers from producing a generic
drug.31 Generic drug manufacturers sometimes use Paragraph IV challenges to
attack these secondary patents because secondary patents protect characteristics
that are often replaceable and able to be substituted when the generic drug
manufacturer manufactures its drug. 32 These changes can often be made
without seriously altering the drug's potency.33 The FDA grants patent rights to
Id.; 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).
Kesselheim et al., supra note 5, at 1439.
26 Id
27 Id.; 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2012).
28 Kesselheim et al., supra note 5, at 1439.
29 Id. at 1439-40.
3o Id. at 1440.
31 Id
24
25

32 Id
33

Id
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the first generic manufacturer to file a successful Paragraph IV claim, so the
process is essentially a race to the finish line.34 Whichever manufacturer
succeeds in this race is entitled to 180 days of exclusive rights to manufacture a
generic version of the drug.35 This grant creates a duopoly in the market with
respect to that drug, because the drug is typically offered at its original price
during this period. 36 This provides a strong incentive for generic drug
manufacturers to file a Paragraph IV challenge, even if it means challenging
illegitimate or weak patents.37 Brand-name manufacturers deploy a tactic of
their own, however. Because the filing of a Paragraph IV challenge constitutes
a technical infringement of their patent, manufacturers can respond by filing
lawsuit for patent infringement.38 This lawsuit triggers a thirty-month stay of
approval under ANDA, which delays generic manufacturers' challenges and
creates opportunities for reverse payment deals.39
According to the FDA, Paragraph IV challenges have steadily increased in
frequency since the 1980s, when only 2% of ANDAs contained Paragraph IV
certifications.40 From 1998-2000, approximately 20% of all ANDAs contained
Paragraph IV certifications. 41 During this period, generic drug manufacturers
were quite successful in their Paragraph IV challenges, winning approximately
two-thirds of the challenges. 42 ikAely in response to this increase in challenges,
pharmaceutical manufacturers began to pursue an alternative to litigation in
order to protect their patents in the late 1990s: reverse payment agreements. 43
When a brand-name drug manufacturer faced a Paragraph IV challenge for
patent validity or claims that a generic version did not violate its patents, it
would pay a substantial sum of money to quell the first generic drug
manufacturer with a successful Paragraph IV challenge.44 In return, the generic
drug manufacturer promised not to market their drug for a certain period of
time and agreed not to sell or transfer its right to produce its drug for the 180

34

Id.
3s Guidancefor Industry: 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity Under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to
the FederalFood, Drug and Cosmetic Act, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. June 1998), http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/Drugs/Guidances/ucm079342.pdf.
36 Kesselheim et al., supra note 5, at 1440.
37 Id.
38 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2012).
39 Kesselheim et al., supra note 5, at 1440.
40 Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration:An FTC Stud, FED. TRADE COMM'N, July 2002,
at 10, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugsrudy.pdf.
41 Kesselheim et al., supra note 5, at 1440.
42 Id
43 Id
44 Id
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days allotted to them by the FDA.45 This practice sparked a debate over
whether these deals should be considered an illegal restraint on trade under laws
that regulate anti-competitive behavior.46
B. THE ROLE OF ANTITRUST LEGISLATION IN REVERSE PAYMENT DEALS

The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 is a tool with which the federal
government battles illegal restraints on trade.47 The Act declares that "[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal." 48 This Section of the act deals specifically
with collusive agreements in restraint on trade.49 The Sherman Antitrust Act
also places an affirmative duty on the government to investigate and prosecute
potential practices that could potentially violate the Act.50 Another landmark
piece of antitrust legislation is the Clayton Act of 1914. The Clayton Act also
implemented measures that combat practices that Congress deemed to be illegal
restraints on trade.5' Another crucial piece of legislation in this area is the
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), which created the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC).52 The FTC has the responsibility of investigating potential
violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clayton Act.53
There are three main ways in which a legal proceeding involving an antitrust
claim can begin.54 The first is that the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the

45 See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jeff Gerth, How Companies Stall Generics and Keep Themselves
Healthy, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2000, http://partners.nytimes.com/library/national/science/health/0
72300hth-generic-drugs.html (discussing patent dispute between Zenith Goldline Pharmaceuticals
and Abbott Laboratories).
46 Alison Frankel, 3rd CircuitShocker-Pay-for-Delay Drug Settlements are Illegal, THOMSON REUTERS
(July 16, 2012), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2012/07-_.July/3rd_C
ircuit shocker - Pay-for-delay.drug-settlements-areillegal/.
47 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
48 Id
49 Id
50
Id.
51 See 15 U.S.C. §§12-27 (2002); Labor Disputes; Mediation and Injunctive Relief, 29 U.S.C.
$ 52-53 (2006) (prohibiting certain anticompetitive behavior, such as price discrimination and
certain mergers and acquisitions).
2 15 U.S.C. % 41-58 (2006).
53 See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 322 (1966) ("[The Commission is permitted to]
arrest trade restraints in their incipiency without proof that they amount to an outright violation
of § 3 of the Clayton Act or other provisions of the antitrust laws.").
54 Onoe, supra note 8, at 534.
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Department of Justice may bring a civil lawsuit against an alleged colluder.15
Second, the Clayton Act empowers consumers to sue businesses for violations
of its provisions. 56 Third, the FTC may file an administrative complaint under
its statute for an alleged violation. For nongovernmental parties, these options
require that a customer suffered an injury of the kind that the antitrust laws
were designed to protect against. This complaint may be appealed.57
Courts have developed three different standards in evaluating antitrust
claims that allege collusive anticompetitive conduct.58 The first standard is the
"rule of reason" standard. This is the primary method that courts use to
determine whether a "restraint" of competition has occurred.59 This involves a
three-step analysis: (1) the plaintiff must prove an "actual adverse effect on
competition as a whole in the relevant market";60 (2) if the plaintiff meets its
initial burden, the defendant must show that there are pro-competitive effects
of the allegedly collusive behavior;61 (3) if the defendant satisfies this standard,
the plaintiff must recommend "less restrictive" alternatives. 62
Courts developed the second standard, the "per se" approach, because they
believed that the "rule of reason" standard was too onerous for application to
certain types of activities that posed clear risks to competition. 63 These types of
activities include particularly repugnant and restrictive anticompetitive
behaviors and the Supreme Court has held that such violations should be found
to be per se violations "[o]nce experience with a particular kind of restraint

55 Id.; see also SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AM. BAR Assoc., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 54-56, 58 (2007) (stating that the FTC and the DOJ employ similar
procedures for civil investigations).
56 Onoe, supra note 8, at 535; 15 U.S.C. § 15 ("[A]ny person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any
district court of the United States . . . .").
57 Onoe, supra note 8, at 535; 15 U.S.C. § 45(b)-(c) (2006).
58 Onoe, supra note 8, at 536.
5 Id.; State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) ("Although the Sherman Act, by its terms,
prohibits every agreement 'in restraint of trade,' this Court has long recognized that Congress
intended to outlaw only unreasonable restraints.").
60 K.M.B. Warehouse Distrib., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1995); see also
Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (stating a "court must ordinarily
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before
and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual as probable").
61 KM.B. Warehouse, 61 F.3d at 127.
62 Id
63 See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. et al., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (the Supreme
Court finding Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., and others, violated section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act, on a per se basis).
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enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will
condemn it.""6

The third form of analysis that courts have adopted in evaluating antitrust
cases is the "quick look" standard. 65 This method allows courts to simply take a
cursory look at an antitrust case when the actions forming the basis for the
claim "are not per se unlawful but are sufficiently anticompetitive on their face
that they do not require a full-blown rule of reason inquiry." 66
C. PENDING LEGISLATION

There is legislation pending in the Senate that seeks to prohibit reverse
payment deals. It is called the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act,
commonly referred to as the Kohl bill due to its original sponsor, Senator
Herbert Kohl from Wisconsin.67 Although the Kohl bill died in committee, it
was reintroduced with little change on February 4, 2013 by Senators Klobuchar,
Grassley, Curbin, Franken, and Johnson. 68 The bill, if passed, would create a
presumption of illegality for reverse payment deals, defined as a generic drug
company's transfer of (1) "anything of value" from a brand-name drug
manufacturer, and its agreement (2) "to limit or forego research, development,
manufacturing, marketing, or sales of the [generic] product for any period of
time." 69 The Act would allow the presumption to be overcome by "clear and
convincing evidence that the procompetitive benefits of the agreement
outweigh the anticompetitive effects."70
The Act does not prohibit certain behaviors, however, including deals in
which
(1) the value that the generic company receives is no more than
the right to market its product prior to the expiration of the
allegedly infringed patent or other statutory exclusivity; (2) the
payment is for reasonable litigation expenses not exceeding $7.5

Ariz. v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982).
Onoe, supra note 8, at 537.
6 Id; Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 763.
67William H. Rooney, Elai Katz, Amy R. Fitzpatrick, Michelle Leutzinger & Peter J. Scoolidge,
64
65

Retiew of Reverse-PaymentAgreements, 5 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, no. 2, 2009 at 133.
68 Tony Dutra, Kloburbar Reintroduces Bill in Senate to Ijmit Pay-For-Delay Dmug Settlements,

BLOOMBERG L. REP., http://about.bloomberglaw.com/law-reports/klobuchar-reintroduces-bill-i
n-senate-to-limit-pay-for-delay-drug-setdements/; S. 214, 113th Cong. (2013).
69S. 214, 113th Cong. (2013).
70 Id.
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million; or (3) the brand company covenants not to sue for patent
infringement by the generic product.7I
D. THE CURRENT CLIMATE OF REVERSE PAYMENT DEALS IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT INDUSTRY
The current pharmaceutical industry environment is ambiguous and volatile.
Some courts have found that reverse payment deals are presumptively legal and
are not unreasonable restraints on trade, provided that they meet the scope-ofthe-patent test.72 The scope-of-the-patent test has been adopted by the Second,
Eleventh, and Federal Circuit Courts.73 The scope-of-the-patent test does not
utilize antitrust scrutiny when examining reverse payment agreements.74 The
test permits reverse payment agreements as long as "(1) the exclusion does not
exceed the patent's scope, (2) the patent holder's claim of infringement was not
objectively baseless, and (3) the patent was not procured by fraud on the
[US]PTO."75 On the other hand, the Federal Trade Commission has openly
criticized reverse payment deals, long calling for courts to find them illegal.76
The Third Circuit became the first to side with the FTC and, in doing so, has
created a split among the courts.77
1. The Stance of the Second Circuit:In re Tamoxjfen CitrateAntitrust Liigation.
a. Facts and ProceduralHistory. The rationale behind the scope-of-thepatent test is perhaps best laid out in In re Tamoxifen CitrateAntitrust Lidgadion
(Tamoxjfen) for the purposes of this Note. The Second Circuit ruled in
Tamoxifen that reverse payment agreements are presumptively legal and do not
constitute an illegal restraint on trade unless they fall outside the scope of the
patent. 8 The case involved the drug Tamoxifen, which Imperial Chemical
Industries, PLC patented on August 20, 1985, and sold through its subsidiary,
Zeneca.79 Tamoxifen was the most prescribed drug for cancer in the world.80
Four months after the FDA awarded Imperial the patent for Tamoxifen, Barr
Id.
In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006); FTC v. Watson Pharm.,
Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012).
73 Onoe, supra note 7, at 537-38.
74 In re K-Dur Antritrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 214.
7s Id.; see also In re Ciproflaxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 363 F. Supp. 2d 514
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (advocating for the scope-of-the-patent test and elaborating on its elements).
76 See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012) (arguing that
such reverse payment settlements are unfair and violate federal antitrust laws).
77 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012).
78 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006).
79 Id. at 193.
so Id.
71
72

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2013

11

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 3

J.INTELL

326

PROP.L

[Vol. 20:315

Laboratories, Inc., a generic drug manufacturer, filed an ANDA with the FDA
(which was later amended to include a Paragraph IV challenge) in an attempt to
market a generic version of Tamoxifen. 8' In response, Imperial filed a patent
infringement lawsuit against Barr as well as Barr's raw material supplier in the
Southern District of New York.82 The district court concluded that the patent
Imperial held for Tamoxifen was invalid due to its apparent withholding of
safety information from the PTO when the patent was filed.83
Imperial subsequently appealed the decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, after which the parties entered into a private
agreement. In the agreement, Zeneca granted Barr a non-exclusive license to
sell Zeneca-manufactured Tamoxifen in exchange for $21 million and Barr
agreeing to change its ANDA Paragraph IV challenge to a paragraph III
challenge, thereby agreeing that it would not market its own generic version of
Tamoxifen until Zeneca's patent expired in 2002."8 Furthermore, the parties
agreed that Zeneca was to pay Heumann, Barr's raw material provider, $9.5
million up-front and another $35.9 million over the next ten years. Finally, the
parties agreed that if the Tamoxifen patent was found invalid on appeal, Barr
would be allowed to revert to a Paragraph IV ANDA challenge.85
While other generic drug companies (such as Pharmachemie and Mylan)
waged a legal battle to obtain rights to Tamoxifen, Zeneca and Barr were
besieged with thirty lawsuits filed by consumers and consumer groups decrying
their reverse payment deal.86 The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
transferred these lawsuits to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York where they were subsequently consolidated into a class
action complaint.87 The plaintiffs in Tamo.zfen, consumers of the drug and
consumer protection groups, claimed that Barr would seek to prevent any other
manufacturer from marketing another generic version of Tamoxifen pursuant
to its agreement with Zeneca.88 Indeed, when Imperial's patent on Tamoxifen
expired five years later, Barr invoked its right to a 180-day exclusivity period
that resulted from its status as the first ANDA filer with a Paragraph IV

81 Id
82

Id

Id.
8 Id. at 193-94; see also In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 277 F. Supp. 2d 121, 125-26
(E.D.N.Y. 2003).
85 In re Tarnoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 194 (2d Cir. 2005).
8 Id. at 195, 196.
87 Id. at 196.
83

88

Id.
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challenge, effectively preventing other generic drug companies from marketing
their generic copies of Tamoxifen during that period.89
The plaintiffs made five allegations: that the reverse payment deal unlawfully
(1) enabled Zeneca and Barr to resuscitate a patent that the
district court had already held to be invalid and unenforceable; (2)
facilitated Zeneca's continuing monopolization of the market for
Tamoxifen; (3) provided for the sharing of unlawful monopoly
profits between Zeneca and Barr; (4) maintained an artificially
high price for Tamoxifen; and (5) prevented competition from
other generic manufacturers of Tamoxifen.90
The District Court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.91 The District Court
concluded that "although market-division agreements between a monopolist
and a potential competitor ordinarily violate the Sherman Act, they are not
necessarily unlawful when the monopolist is a patent holder." 92 Furthermore,
the court reasoned that "a patent holder may settle patent litigation by entering
into a licensing agreement with the alleged infringer without running afoul of
the Sherman Act," but "a patent holder is prohibited from acting in bad faith
'beyond the limits of the patent monopoly' to restrain or monopolize trade."93
The district court dismissed all of the plaintiffs' Sherman Act claims as well as
their state claims, which alleged antitrust violations of state laws, consumer
protection laws, and unfair competition laws. 94 The plaintiffs appealed to the
Second Circuit and the defendants filed a motion to transfer the case to the
Federal Circuit on the grounds that the Second Circuit lacked jurisdiction to
hear patent challenges, typically heard by the Federal Circuit Court.95 The
Second Circuit denied the defendants' motion to transfer and affirmed the
decision of the district court.96
b. The Rationale of the Second Circuit Court. The Second Circuit first rejected
the defendants' claim that it lacked jurisdiction.97 The Federal Circuit has
9

Id.

90 Id.

at 196-97.

91 Id at 197.

Id.; In a Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 277 F. Supp. 2d 121, 128-29 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 194, 197 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing In
re
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 277 F. Supp. 2d 121, 128-29 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)).
94 Id. at 198.
95 Id
96 Id. at 199.
97 Id.
92
93
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exclusive jurisdiction over cases on appeal from a federal district court under
section 1338 of title 28, which states that federal district courts have original
and exclusive jurisdiction over "any civil action arising under any Act of
Congress relating to patents."98 The test for whether a case "arises under"
federal patent law is whether "a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that
federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief
necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law,
in that patent law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded
The Second Circuit concluded that it did, indeed, have
complaints."99
jurisdiction because the plaintiffs were not asking it to rule on the validity of the
patents involved, but rather on the validity of the reverse payment deal and
whether there had been an antitrust violation.1oo
With respect to the plaintiffs' antitrust claims, the court noted the
0
competing principles between antitrust law and patent law.' ' The court noted
that the goal of the Sherman Act was to prevent an entity from "monopol[izing]
02
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States,"1 while patent
law is, in essence, "the right to exclude others from profiting by the patented
invention." 03 The Second Circuit found that the tensions between the
underlying principles of these areas of law complicated the appeal.'0
Interestingly, prior to addressing the plaintiffs complaint, the court stated
that it approached the problem through a lens that encouraged private
settlement of disputes. 05 The Court further noted that the Sherman Act does
not prevent parties with a patent dispute from settling the matter outside of
court.10 6 The Second Circuit went on to note that restricting patent settlements
may be contrary to the goals of patent law.'o? In support of this notion the
court noted that these restrictions would cause an increase in patent litigation,

98 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
In r Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust LUtig., 466 F.3d 187, 199 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809 (1988)).
1ooId. at 200.
101Id. at 201-02.
102 Id. at 201.
103 Id. at 202 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1; Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215
(1980)).
104 Id
105 Id. ("Where a case is complex and expensive, and resolution of the case will benefit the
public, the public has a strong interest in settlement." (quoting United States v. Glens Falls

Newspapers, Inc., 160 F.3d 853, 856 (2d Cir. 1998))).
106 Id (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931)); cf Flex-Foot, Inc. v.

CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
1o7In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 203 (2d Cir. 2005).
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which would "heighten the uncertainty surrounding patents and might delay
innovation." 0 8 While the Second Circuit recognized that forcing patent
litigation to continue could benefit consumers "in some instances," it found this
benefit to be outweighed by the greater efficiencies that patent settlements
provide for.'09 The court stated that such settlements allow for the disposal of
cases which would otherwise "block or delay" the introduction of "valuable
inventions.""( In passing, the court also indicated that intent is a critical factor
in determining whether such a settlement is illegal."' It cited the Fourth
Circuit, stating "[i]t is only when settlement agreements are entered into in bad
faith and are utilized as part of a scheme to restrain or monopolize trade that
antitrust violations may occur."11 2
The Second Circuit also refuted the plaintiffs' premise that the district
court's ruling that Imperial's Tamoxifen patent was invalid (Tamoxifen 1) would
have been upheld on review." 3 The court stated that it did not have the power
to take into account what the result of Tamoxifen I would have been on review
because the Federal Circuit Court had exclusive jurisdiction over such patent
cases. It also stated that assessing the possible outcome of Tamoxifen I on
review would be "of limited value" in evaluating the behavior of the parties
when entering into the reverse payment agreement.1 4 The court found the fact
that Zeneca settled after it lost its case to Barr in the district court unpersuasive
as the sole argument that the settlement was unlawful."t5
The Second Circuit then turned to the validity of the reverse payment deal.
The court noted that plaintiffs challenging the validity of such agreements need
to provide "something more" than just evidence that the deal existed.11 6 The
plaintiffs claimed that the value of the reverse payments from Zeneca to Barr
was significantly greater than the result of Barr's best case scenario-winning
the appeal and marketing its own product-and that the size of the deal, in
addition to its existence violated the Sherman Antitrust Act." 7 Despite the
108Id. at 203 (citing Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1308 (11th Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 308 (2004)).
109 Id
110

Id

I11Id. at 205.
112 Id. at 203; Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 540 F.2d 1215, 1220 (4th Cir. 1976).
u1 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 203-04; see also Imperial Chem.
Indus.,
PLC v. Barr Labs., Inc., 795 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
114 In rOTamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 203-04 (citing
Whitmore v. Arkansas,
495 U.S. 149, 159-60 (1990)).
115 Id. at 205.
116 Id
117 Id
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specifity of this pleading, however, the Second Circuit nonetheless considered
whether the mere existence of a reverse payment deal was legal under the
Sherman Antitrust Act." 8 It held that the mere existence of a reverse payment
9
deal did not constitute a per se violation." The Second Circuit cited several
reasons for deciding against per se illegality. First, it found that a reverse
20
payment by itself does not turn an otherwise lawful deal into an unlawful one.1
The court further stated "[a] ban on reverse-payment settlements would reduce
the incentive to challenge patents by reducing the challenger's settlement
options should he be sued for infringement, and so might well be thought
anticompetitive."121
Crucial to the Second Circuit's decision was the current infrastructure
designed to address challenges to pharmaceutical patents-an infrastructure
created by the Hatch-Waxman Act.122 The court quoted a rationale previously
articulated by the Eleventh Circuit, stating that the
Hatch-Waxman essentially redistributes the relative risk
assessments and explains the flow of settlement funds and their
magnitude. Because of the Hatch-Waxman scheme, [the generic
challengers] gain[] considerable leverage in patent litigation: the
exposure to liability amount[s] to litigation costs, but pale[s] in
comparison to the immense volume of generic sales and
profits.123
Accepting this reasoning, the court was not persuaded to declare reverse
24
payments illegal per se.1
Next, the court determined the legality of "excessive" reverse payment deals
concluding that even though reverse payment deals may be a natural result of
the Hatch-Waxman Act's infrastructure, they may be illegal in some
circumstances.125 The court reasoned that the deals could be used to mask
price-fixing behavior, giving the example of a company that obtains a patent
knowing it is likely invalid, that nevertheless sues its competitors and settles the

118

Id.

119Id. at 206.
120Id. (citing Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003)).
121Id. (quoting Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D. Ill.
2003)).
122 Id. at 207.

123Id. (quoting Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1074 (11th Cit. 2005)).
124

Id.

125Id. at 208.
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suit by giving them permission to use the patent in return for assurances that
the competitors would not price their product below a certain level.126 The
court admitted that there is something "on the face of [excessive reverse
payment deals] that seem[s] 'suspicious.' "127 It concluded, however, that this
suspicious behavior can be legitimately explained.128 The Court reasoned that if
patent litigation continued and the patent holder lost the suit, in addition to the
brand-name manufacturer no longer being the sole producer of the drug on the
market, the competition would force the brand-name manufacturer to lower
prices, resulting in a further loss of profits.129 Even though an excessive
settlement may indicate that the manufacturer believed it had an invalid patent,
the court found that this could not necessarily be concluded due to the inherent
risk of loss in any suit.130
The court additionally considered a possible rule based on an alternate
reading of the antitrust laws, which would outlaw nearly all settlements
pertaining to the Hatch-Waxman Act.131 Ultimately, the court found this
reading to be contrary to established principles of law, which encourage
settlement in order to obtain greater efficiency, even if it risked upholding
monopolies based on weak or invalid patents.132
Specifically, the court held that
Unless and until the patent is shown to have been procured by
fraud, or a suit for its enforcement is shown to be objectively
baseless, there is no injury to the market cognizable under
existing antitrust law, as long as competition is restrained only
within the scope of the patent. 33
Significantly, the Second Circuit applied the scope-of-the-patent test, which
reads that "absent an extension of the monopoly beyond the patent's scope ...
and absent fraud,. . . the question is whether the underlying infringement

126

Id.

127

Id.
Jd

128

129Id. at 209.
130 Id. at 209-10.
131 Id. at 212.
132

Id.

133 Id. at 213 (quoting In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride
Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514,

535 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)).
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lawsuit was 'objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could
realistically expect success on the merits.' "13
The Second Circuit concluded in In re Tamoxifen Uzfgation by holding that the
exclusionary effects of the settlement agreement did not exceed the scope of
the patent.135 In support of this conclusion, the court noted that the agreement
136
did not hinder the introduction or marketing of non-infringing drugs.
Additionally, the settlement agreement in question signified the conclusion of
the litigation between Zeneca and Barr, therefore creating the opportunity for
the Tamoxifen patent to be challenged by other generic drug companies (as Barr
made it clear that it was not entitled to the 180-day exclusivity period) since the
137
Finally, the Court concluded
patent was not found to be invalid on appeal.
that the settlement agreement did not completely foreclose the competitive
market for Tamoxifen because it still allowed Barr to market Tamoxifen for
eight months following the execution of the agreement which, the Court
138
In
argued, still provided the public with the positive benefits of competition.
that
allegation
plausible
any
of
absence
the
"[i]n
that
held
conclusion, the Court
the reverse payment provided benefits to Zeneca outside the scope of the
[T]amoxifen patent, the plaintiffs have not stated a claim for relief with respect
39
to the [s]ettlement [a]greement."'
2. The Stance of the Third Circuit:In re K-DurAntitrust ihgation
a. Facts and Procedural History. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation (K-Dur)
concerned a patent for the drug K-Dur 20 patented by the brand-name
140
Upsher was the first
manufacturer Schering-Plough Corporation (Schering).
to distribute a
rights
the
for
apply
to
manufacturer
generic pharmaceutical
IV challenge,
a
Paragraph
filing
the
ANDA,
generic version of K-Dur 20 under
of a
because
patent
Schering's
on
infringe
not
did
claiming that its patent
141
Schering
generic.
its
of
coating
the
of
difference in the chemical make-up
subsequently sued Upsher in the district court of New Jersey, triggering a thirty-

134 Id (quoting Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49,
60 (1993)).
135

Id.

136 Id. at 213-14 (citing In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 618, 632 (E.D.

Mich. 2000), afd, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, sub nom. Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Kroger
Co., 543 U.S. 939, 125 (2004)).
137 Id. at 214-15 (citing In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188,

200M1 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)).
138 Id. at 215.
139 Id at 216 (citing Twombly v. Bell Ad. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 111 (2d Cir. 2005)).
140 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2012).
141Id. at 205.
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month automatic stay in the FDA's approval of Upsher's generic drug.142 just
hours before the District Court was expected to rule on the case, the parties
reached a settlement.143 The agreement provided that Upsher, who did not
concede that Schering's patent was valid, would nonetheless refrain from
introducing its generic for approximately four years, after which it would
receive a non-royalty non-exclusive license to market the generic.
The
agreement additionally provided that Schering would obtain licenses to sell
several of Upsher's other products, including Niacor-SR, in exchange for a
payment of $60 million, in addition to other smaller sums based on Schering's
future sales.144 Schering similarly entered into an agreement with ESI Lederle
(ESI) another generic company that was also seeking to market a generic
version of K-Dur 20.145 The agreement provided that Schering would provide
ESI with a royalty-free license of the K-Dur drug beginning in 2004 in
exchange for Schering to pay ESI $5 million and an additional amount to be
determined by the successfulness of ESI's ANDA claim.146 The agreement
further provided that ESI did not plan on developing any other similar drug.147
In March of 2001, the FTC filed a complaint against Schering, Upsher, and
ESI alleging that they violated Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.148 The K-Dur plaintiffs alleged that the sale of the license to market
Niacor-SR was merely a pretext and that the $60 million was in exchange for
the promise to keep the generic drug off the market.149 The FTC claimed that
the settlement agreement between the parties delayed the introduction of the
generic drug into the market and improperly extended Schering's monopoly of
the K-Dur 20 patent.15
In June of 2002, the Administrative Law Judge
dismissed the FTC claim after a lengthy trial, finding that the licensing provision
in the agreement were separately valued and the consideration was thus not a
payment to delay generic entry.s'5
In December, 2003, the FTC
Commissioners, who are responsible for reviewing administrative law judge's
opinions, reversed the judge's decision dismissing the FTC's complaint, holding
that there was a " 'direct nexus between Schering's payment and Upsher's
agreement to delay its competitive entry' and that this agreement 'unreasonably

144
145

Id
Id
Id. at 206.
Id

146

Id.

147

148

Id.
Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 45.

149

In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 206.

142
143

150
151

Id. at 197, 206-07.
Id
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restrain[ed] commerce.' "152 This decision was subsequently considered an
appeal.
b. The Rationale of the Third Circuit Court. In its ruling, the Third Circuit
rejected the scope-of-the-patent test.153 It argued that the scope-of-the-patent
test "improperly restricts the application of antitrust law and is contrary to the
policies underlying the Hatch-Waxman Act as well as a long line of Supreme
54
The Third Circuit
Court precedent on patent litigation and competition."1
55
gave several reasons for refuting the scope-of-the-patent test.1 First, the court
claimed that the test had an "almost unrebuttable presumption of patent
validity." 5 6 The court noted that the test essentially resulted in a court
enforcing a presumption that the patent holder would have won the suit, a
57
policy which it found to be unsupported by patent law.1 The court admitted
that the same presumption exists when one challenges the validity of a patent,
but argued that it was a procedural right, not a substantive right, and that it
should not be used in this context. 58 Furthermore, the court noted that in
patent infringement cases, as opposed to patent validity cases, "the patent
59
holder bears the burden of showing infringement."1 Lastly, the court pointed
out that such an unrebuttable presumption contradicts many of the actual
60
outcomes of challenges under the Hatch-Waxman Act.1 Indeed, it stated that
6
a patent is simply a "legal conclusion reached by the Patent Office,"' 1and that
under the Hatch-Waxman Act, Paragraph IV patent challenges have been
successful "seventy-three percent of the time" (as of 2002).162
Second, the Third Circuit found fault with the Second Circuit's reasoning
that the subsequent challenges by other generic drug companies would
63
effectively reject weak patents preserved by reverse payments.1 The court
noted that the first generic challenger had the greatest incentive because it alone

152 Id. at 207 (quoting In re Schering-Plough Corp., Final Order, 136 F.T.C. 956, 1052 (2003)).
1s3 Id. at 214.
1 Id.
155
156
157

Id.
Id
Id

158 Id. (citing Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).

1s9 Id. (citing Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 679 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
160 Id.at 214-15.
161 Id. at 215.
162 Id. (quoting Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969) (citing Fed. Trade Comm'n,
GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION

17

16 (2002), available at http://www.ftc. gov/os/2002/07/genericdrug study.pdf)).
163 Id
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would receive the 180-day period of exclusivity.' 64 Also, the monopolistic
nature of the drug marketing system provided sufficient revenue to "pay off"
multiple generic companies, thereby preserving the patent's validity (and its
monopoly) despite its likely invalidity.165
The Third Circuit further claimed that Supreme Court precedent supported
this argument.166 The court noted that the Supreme Court recognized that
"valid patents are a limited exception to a general rule of the free exploitation of
ideas" and that it could therefore be reasoned that "public interest supports
judicial testing and elimination of weak patents." 67 The court claimed that this
philosophy was supported by the Supreme Court's holding in Edward Kaqinger
Co. v. Chicago Metallic Manufacturing Co. (Katynger).'68 Katyinger concerned an
action for a declaratory judgment relating to the alleged invalidity and
infringement of a patent.169 The Court stated that a price-fixing provision in a
contract based on an invalid patent would serve to violate antitrust law because
the licensor would be estopped from bringing a challenge to the patent.170 The
Katinger Court emphasized the great importance that the public interest plays in
the patent system, highlighting the broad public interest in freeing our
competitive economy from the trade restraints which might be imposed by
price-fixing agreements stemming from narrow or invalid patents." The court
continued:

164

Id.

165 Id. ("[D]rug manufacturer settled infringement suits by four generic firms, which agreed to

delay market entry 'in exchange for significant payments . .. for various licensing agreements,
supply agreements and research and development deals.'" (citing King Drug Co. of Florence, 702
F. Supp. 2d at 521-22)).
166 Id. at 215-16.
167 Id. (explaining the "importance to the public at large of resolving questions of patent
validity" and noting the danger of "grant[ing] monopoly privileges to the holders of invalid
patents") (citing Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1993)); Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (noting that the patent laws
embody "a careful balance between the need to promote innovation and the recognition that
imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the very
lifeblood of a competitive economy"); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277 (1942)
("A patent affords no immunity for a monopoly not fairly or plainly within the grant.. . . [S]ince
patents are privileges restrictive of a free economy, the rights which Congress has attached to
them must be strictly construed. . . ."); Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234, 12 S. Ct.
632, 36 L. Ed. 414 (1892) ("It is as important to the public that competition should not be
repressed by worthless patents, as that the patentee of a really valuable invention should be
protected in his monopoly. . ..").
168 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 216.
169 Katzinger Co. v. Chi. Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394 (1947).
170 Id.
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It is the public interest which is dominant in the patent system
and . .. the right to challenge [a patent] is not only a private right
to the individual, but it is founded on public policy which is
promoted by his making the defence, and contravened by his
refusal to make it.171
The Third Circuit found this reasoning applicable to the reverse payment
practice because the deals allow for a duopoly of competitors without a
guarantee that the patent underlying the product is valid.172 The court asserted
that the scope-of-the-patent test failed to account for these principles of patent
73
law previously outlined by the Supreme Court.
The Third Circuit also addressed the Congressional intent for the HatchWaxman Act.174 It recognized that Congress intended the Hatch-Waxman Act
to strike a delicate balance between protecting intellectual property and allowing
competition.s75 The Third Circuit concluded that the antitrust analysis of
reverse payments under a rule of reason test was more in line with the balance
that Congress sought to create with the Hatch-Waxman legislation than the
scope-of-the-patent test. 7 6
The Third Circuit admitted that the scope-of-the-patent test promoted
settlements, which are judicially "laudable," but found that the general
preference for settlement is superseded in this instance by the countervailing
public policy that was set forth by Congress: "that litigated patent challenges are
necessary to protect consumers from unjustified monopolies by name brand
drug manufacturers." 77 The Third Circuit further argued that a rule of reason
test did not diminish the parties' ability to reach settlements concerning a
negotiated entry date for marketing the generic. 78 The court made it clear that
the ruling in this case pertained specifically to settlements involving a reverse

171Id at 401.
172 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 216 (suggesting an agreement might be
anticompetitive if it "give[s] potential competitors incentives to remain in cartels rather than
turning to another product, inventing around the patent, or challenging its validity" (citing United
States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1981))).
173

Id

174 Id. at 216-17.

17s Id at 217 (citing 130 CONG. REc. 24,425 (Sept. 6, 1984)); H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 30
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2713 (emphasizing that the bill achieves "what the
Congress has traditionally done in the area of intellectual property law[:] balance the need to
stimulate innovation against the goal of furthering the public interest").
176 In re K-Dur Antitrust LUtig., 686 F.3d at 217.
's
178

Id.
Idat 217-18.
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payment from the name brand manufacturer to the generic drug company,
which, according to the FTC, would not affect the vast majority of
pharmaceutical patent settlements.' 79
The Third Circuit then explained its proposal for use of the "quick look"
rule of reason analysis.18 This abbreviated rule of reason test would be "based
on the economic realities of the reverse payment settlement rather than the
labels applied by the settling parties."' 8 ' The court went a step further, insisting
that courts find that any agreement involving a payment from the patent holder
to the potential patent infringer for the purpose of delaying a generic's entry
into the market constitutes prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint on
trade.182 This prima facie presumption could be rebutted by showing that the
payment "(1) was for a purpose other than delayed entry of a generic drug or (2)
offers some pro-competitive benefit." 83
The court explained that this
exception allows for those "probably rare" situations where a reverse payment
could serve to increase competition. 84 As an example, the court described a
situation in which a small payment is made to a needy generic manufacturer so
it can market a generic to avoid bankruptcy. 85 The Third Circuit agreed with
the FTC that the court did not need to consider the underlying merits of the
patent suit because "[a]bsent proof of other offsetting consideration, it is logical
to conclude that the quid pro quo for the payment was an agreement by the
generic to defer entry beyond the date that represents an otherwise reasonable
litigation compromise." 8 6 In light of the above arguments and analysis, the
Third Circuit reversed the decision of the District Court and became the first
circuit court to reject the scope-of-the-patent test and find reverse payments
prima facie evidence of an illegal restraint on trade.'87
3. Supreme Court Response. The circuit split regarding treatment of reverse
payment deals and corresponding appeals from various circuits created a rather
unique set of options available to the United States Supreme Court when
choosing which case it would hear on the issue. The procedural history and
'79 Id. at 218 (citing FTC, Bureau of Competition, Agreements Filed with the Federal Trade
Commission under the Medicare PrescrptionDng, Improvement, and ModernitationAct of 2003: Oveniew of
Agreements Filed in FY 2010, 2 (2011) (showing that nearly 75% of Hatch-Waxman Act
infringement suits that settled in 2010 did so without reverse payments)).
1s0 Id
181 Id.
182 Id
183 Id.
184 Id
18 Id.
186
187

Id. (quoting In re Schering-Plough Corp., Final Order, 136 Fed. Trade Comm'n at 988).
Id.
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factual background of the underlying cases provided a myriad of related issues
and varying party plaintiffs. In the end, it decided to grant certiorari to Watson,
an FTC challenge to a reverse payment deal.'88
Watson involved a prescription drug called AndroGel, a product developed
by Besins Healthcare, S.A. (Besins) and distributed by Solvay Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. (Solvay), to treat low testosterone in men.'89 Two generic manufacturers,
Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Watson) and Paddock Laboratories, Inc.
(Paddock) filed Paragraph IV challenges to the AndroGel patent.190 In
response, Solvey instituted a patent infringement action, which was ultimately
settled by a reverse payment agreement.191 In addition to several other terms,
the agreement provided that the generic drug companies would refrain from
marketing their generic versions of AndroGel until August 31, 2015 in exchange
for multimillion dollar yearly payments from Solvay.192 The FTC subsequently
filed a complaint, alleging that the deal constituted an illegal restraint on
trade.193 The Eleventh Circuit adopted the scope-of-the-patent test and, in
doing so, found that the FTC's complaint failed to state a plausible antitrust
claim.194
The Supreme Court recently denied the petition of a case that dealt with the
legality of reverse payment deals.'95 The case, decided as In re Cjprofloxadn
Hydrochloride Anitrust Litigation, held that reverse payment deals were
presumptively legal and endorsed the scope-of-the-patent test, adding intrigue
as to how the Supreme Court will rule on the legality of reverse payment deals
in Watson. The denial of certiorari could indicate approval of the scope-of-thepatent test as the Court passed on this opportunity to reject it.196
Prior to granting certiorari to Watson, the U.S. Supreme Court could have
chosen from two other petitions for writs of certiorari. In In re K-Dur (K-Dur),
the successor-in-interest of the brand-name manufacturer filed for a writ of
It was only after this filing that the FTC followed suit and
certiorari.'19
appealed the ruling in Watson to the Eleventh Circuit.'98 It is also notable that

18 Watson, 677 F.3d at 1298.
189 Id at 1303-04.

19 Id at 1304.
191 Id. at 1304-05.
192 Id. at 1305.
193 Id. at 1301.
194 Id. at 1312.

195Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co. v. Bayer AG, 131 S. Ct. 1606 (2011).
196 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
197 In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 197.
198 Watson, 677 F.3d at 1298; Alison Frankel, FTC certpetitionputs SCOTUS in pay-for-delaypickle,
THOMSON REuTERs NEWS & INSIGHT (Oct. 5, 2012), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.
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the Supreme Court did not decide to rule on both of these cases, a rare (but not
unheard-of) circumstance.' 99
By filing the writ of certiorari for Watson, the FTC hopes to take control of
the manner in which the Supreme Court rules on reverse payment deals. The
FTC provided the Supreme Court with a rationale as to why it should grant the
writ of certiorari for Watson instead of K-Dur, asserting several key points. 200
The FTC stated that the K-Dur case concerned private litigation, whereas Watson
was brought by a federal agency given a mandate by Congress to investigate
illegal restraints on trade.201 Further, the FTC claimed that the Supreme Court
would benefit from its expertise in the field of consumer protection litigation. 202
Furthermore, Thomas Rosch, a commissioner of the FTC, claimed that Watson
provided a clearer presentation of the issue than K-Dur because it was decided
on a motion to dismiss, which "presents a core issue of law," rather than on a
motion for summary judgment, as was the case in K-Dur.203 Furthermore, the
remedy sought in K-Dur is only retrospective in nature, while Watson involves a
patent that has not expired yet and therefore presents the possibility of an
injunction. 204 Perhaps most importantly, however, unlike K-Dur, Watson raises
the question of both patent validity and infringement. 205 It is notable that the
Supreme Court decided not to take up K-Dur, since it is the first case in which a
federal circuit court has ruled that pay-for-delay deals are presumptively
illegal. 206 The Supreme Court's decision indicates that it does not believe that
K-Dur provides a better vessel for addressing the arguments against the scopeof-the-patent test voiced by the Third Circuit. 207

com/Legal/News/ViewNews.aspx?id=58471&terms=%4OReutersTopicCodes+CONTAINS+'
ANV'.
199 Frankel, supra note 198.
200 Id
201 Id.
202 Id
203 Rosch, supra note 3.
204 Frankel, supra note 198.
205 Id.; Jillian Centanni, Supreme Court to Examine Pay-For-Delay Settlements, GIBBONS (Dec. 17,
2012), http://www.iplawalert.com/2012/12/articlees/patent-1 /supreme-court-to-examine-payf
ordelay-settlements/.
206 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012).
207 Alison Frankel, FTC certpetidon puts SCOTUS in pay-for-delay pickle, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS
& INSIGHT (Oct. 5, 2012), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/ViewNews.
aspx?id=58471&terms=%40ReutersTopicCodes+CONTAINS+'ANV'.
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III. ANALYSIS
This section first provides far the necessary components for a successful test
for judicial scrutiny of reverse payment deals, taking into account the judicial
reasoning found in Tamoxifen and K-Dur. Secondly, a new test is proposed,
called the "Modified Scope-of-the-Patent Test" (MSPT).
A. THE INGREDIENTS OF A SUCCESSFUL SOLUTION TO THE REVERSE
PAYMENT PROBLEM

The four components necessary for a successful reverse payment test are
the: (1) protection of intellectual property, (2) promotion of competition, (3)
assurance of patent validity, and (4) promotion of consumer interest.
The first two components, protection of intellectual property and the
promotion of competition, in many ways oppose one another. Indeed, in KDur the Third Circuit stated that the optimal solution for the problem that
reverse payment agreements pose should strike a delicate balance between the
need for protection of intellectual property and the need for competition. 208
On the one hand, the Court must respect the wishes of pharmaceutical patent
holders as owners of property, who have the right to use their property in the
way they see fit to the exclusion of others. On the other hand, the protection
of the pharmaceutical patent industry and consumers provides incentive to
challenge invalid patents as they both hamper the pharmaceutical market and
cost consumers a great deal due to legal monopolies or duopolies. 209
Furthermore, the effects on competition must be fully examined. Treating
reverse payments as prima facie evidence of a restraint on trade has the
potential to promote competition by ensuring that invalid patents do not lead to
monopolies or duopolies in the pharmaceutical patent industry. However, the
quick look rule of reason test may have unintended negative effects on
competition as well. Reverse payment deals have become a fallback mechanism
that brand-name manufacturers use to ensure continued profits on newlydeveloped drugs. If this fallback mechanism is taken away, brand-name
manufacturers may be less inclined to spend the vast amounts of money and
resources necessary to create new drugs. This lack of incentive could end up
hurting competition more than helping it. Therefore, the first two necessary
ingredients, protection of intellectual property and promotion of competition,
See id. at 216-17 (referencing 130 CONG. REc. 24425 (Sept. 6, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Waxman underscoring the "fundamental balance of the bill")); H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 30
208

(1984), repinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2713.
w In n K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 216.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol20/iss2/3

26

Balajthy: A Pharmaceutical Park Place: Why the Supreme Court Should Modify

2013]

A PHARMACEUTICAL PARK PLACE

341

must be delicately balanced and must take into consideration the future
consequences of the chosen test.
The third component is assurance of patent validity. When considering this
component, it is important to keep in mind that the actual assessment of a
patent's validity falls outside of the scope of a test that is related to reverse
payment deals under a traditional antitrust analysis. However, the test that the
Supreme Court ultimately accepts will have an impact on how many potentially
invalid patents are allowed to survive. For instance, as the K-Dur court pointed
out, the scope-of-the-patent test utilizes a presumption that the patent in
question is valid, which may result in the preservation of patents that are
actually invalid. 210 The quick look rule of reason test articulated in K-Dur, on
the other hand, treats reverse payment deals as prima facie evidence of an illegal
restraint on trade, thereby disallowing brand-name manufacturers from using
reverse payment deals to protect invalid patents. 211 How the Supreme Court
approaches the threat of patent invalidity will greatly influence which test it will
choose to utilize. If it finds the threat of invalid patents to be a superseding
issue, as the K-Dur court did, it may choose to adopt the quick look rule of
reason test.212 If the Supreme Court finds that the threat of invalid patents is
superseded by another one of these components, however, it may endorse a test
similar to the scope-of-the-patent test, which emphasizes preservation of
intellectual property through its presumption of patent validity.213
Consideration of consumer interest is the final necessary component for a
successful reverse payment test. In a pharmaceutical setting, consumers prefer
low cost drugs in order to maximize their buying power. Consumer interest is
served when the market is flooded with products, which then drives down the
cost. The scope-of-the-patent test's presumption of validity allows monopolies
and duopolies to form due to the dealmakers' agreement of exclusivity. This
reduction of competition among manufacturers drives up prices for consumers.
The Third Circuit's quick look rule of reason analysis is more beneficial for
consumers in this respect because it views reverse payment deals as prima facie
evidence of a restraint on trade. This prevents brand-name manufacturers from
extending their exclusive license of their product by making deals with generic
manufacturers, who would otherwise sell the product for a lower price.

Id. at 214.
Id. at 218.
212 Id. at 216 (citing Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chi. Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394, 399 (1947)).
213 Id. at 214.
210
211
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B. A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW TEST CONCERNING THE LEGALITY OF REVERSE
PAYMENT AGREEMENTS

The Tamozjfen and K-Dur courts provide different rationales, which can be
used to evaluate potential reverse payment tests. The scope-of-the-patent test
has received the most widespread approval thus far, having been endorsed by
the Second, Eleventh and Federal Circuits. 214 The Third Circuit utilized the less
popular quick look rule of reason test. Considering the benefits and pitfalls of
both tests, this Note proposes a test that may be better suited to meeting the
underlying public policy needs of the pharmaceutical patent system.
The proposed model test is called the Modified Scope-of-the-Patent Test
(MSPT). As its name implies, it is a variation on the scope-of-the-patent test.
The decision to use the framework of the scope-of-the-patent test was a
relatively simple one. The scope-of-the-patent test has been widely adopted in
federal circuit courts, having been endorsed by the Second, Eleventh, and
Federal Circuits. 215 Furthermore, the Supreme Court previously declined an
opportunity to review the test in Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., indicating that it
may favor the test, 216 and granted certiorari to Watson rather than K-Dur,
providing further support of this conclusion.
With this widespread
implementation of the scope-of-the-patent test in mind, it seemed prudent to
use it as a basis for a solution to the reverse payment issue.
However, the K-Dur Court articulated several valid criticisms against the
scope-of-the-patent test. Specifically, two main arguments were made: (1) the
test did not take into account the economic realities of the pharmaceutical
patent industry; and (2) the test was overly protective of patents, and therefore
protected potentially invalid patents. 217 Fortunately, a simple modification to
the scope-of-the-patent test could address these concerns and provide a
compromise among the positions of the Third Circuit and the Second, Eleventh
and Federal Circuits. The MSPT proposes adding a fourth element to the
scope-of-the-patent test in which a court would use a balancing test to decide
whether the possible anti-competitive effect of the agreement outweighs the
need for protection of intellectual property. The MSPT would be as follows: a
reverse agreement is allowed as long as "(1) the exclusion does not exceed the
patent's scope, (2) the patent holder's claim of infringement was not objectively
214 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 213; Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Watson
Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1308 (11th Cir. 2012); Onoe, supra note 8, at 538.
215 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cit. 2005); Fed. Trade
Comm'n v.
Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cit. 2012).
216 Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co. v. Bayer AG, 131 S. Ct. 1606 (2011).
217 In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 216-18.
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baseless, [] (3) the patent was not procured by fraud on the PTO," and (4) the
possible anti-competitive effect of the agreement does not outweigh the need
for protection of intellectual property.218
This method has several advantages over other choices. First, as mentioned
above, it utilizes the pre-existing framework of the predominant reverse
payment test. The Supreme Court could easily adopt such an approach in its
Watson decision. This would avoid the uncertain results of a completely new
test. The effects of the scope-of-the-patent test have already been observed;
thus, it is easier to project the legal ramifications of modification of the scopeof-the-patent test than for a new test. In terms of the four essential ingredients
of a successful reverse payment test ((1) protection of intellectual property; (2)
promotion of competition; (3) assurance of patent validity; and (4) consumer
interest), the test provides for a satisfactory response for each.
Considering the protection of intellectual property, the MSPT preserves the
presumption of patent validity, used by the scope-of-the-patent test. This
presumption provides a greater feeling of security to patent holders, and is in
line with the general legal policy of protecting intellectual property.219
Furthermore, greater patent security could serve to provide better incentives for
brand-name manufacturers to invest in developing new pharmaceuticals
because the presumption would allow them to be more confident in defending
their patents.
The concern for the protection of intellectual property is often tempered by
the concern for healthy competition in the marketplace.
The MSPT
accommodates both. The fourth element of the MSPT provides for a safety net
where there is sufficient evidence to indicate that a reverse payment deal could
be considered an illegal restraint on trade. This provides a clear protection for
competition as it allows a court to engage in a quick look analysis of a reverse
payment case, yet still accounts for the impact of the trade on competition. The
K-Dur court criticized the scope-of-the-patent test for failing to take into
account the "economic realities" of the cases in which it was used. 220 The
fourth element of the MSPT does just that by providing an economic context
for the analysis.
In terms of the assurance of patent validity, the MSPT does not provide any
additional means to further examine patent validity. It does, however, filter out
reverse payment deals that could have a significant effect on the pharmaceutical

218Id. at 214 (citing King Drug Co. of Florence v. Cephalon, Inc., 702 F. Supp.
2d 514, 528-29,
533 (E.D. Pa. 2010)).
219 Posner, supra note 1.
220In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 218.
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patent market. Thus, the fourth element of the MSPT "catches" any highprofile deals that might conceal a potentially invalid patent. The approach does
allow for deals that conceal possibly invalid patents if the deal's effect on
competition is minimal. However, if a deal has only a minimal restraint on
trade, then the public interest in revealing that invalidity may be mitigated in a
case in which the deal has no substantial restraint on trade.
Finally, the MSPT is consistent with consumer interest. By catching deals
that would result in a significant restraint on trade, the MSPT would prevent a
market environment that naturally leads to monopolies and duopolies. On the
other hand, the test allows for deals that would not result in a substantial
As mentioned above, this allows for brand-name
restraint on trade.
manufacturers to have confidence in a means of protection for their patents,
and therefore, in the resources they invest in developing a particular drug.
One potential criticism of the MSPT is that, accepting the reasoning of the
22
FTC, almost every reverse payment deal is a restraint on trade. 1 Even if the
Supreme Court does not accept the reasoning of the K-Dur Court, every reverse
payment deal has characteristics of a restraint on trade: they are deals that
essentially prolong a monopoly or duopoly. 222 This is a valid criticism. The
MSPT will force courts to decide where to draw the line between a reverse
payment deal that has a minimal impact on trade and deals that have a
significant restraint on trade. With this in mind, it is recommended that courts
take into account four different factors: (1) the amount of money or other
consideration involved in the deal; (2) the potential market share of the drug; (3)
how critical the need is for the drug (whether a monopoly could produce
widespread harm); and (4) the potential of the drug being pursued and marketed
by another generic company.
In closing, the MSPT provides for the protection of intellectual property,
promotion of competition, assurance of patent validity, and protection of
consumer interest. The test may not satisfy ardent supporters of the reasoning
of the Second, Third, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits, but it is a solution that
finds some middle ground, and has the ingredients necessary for a successful
reverse payment test. Furthermore, the test is simply a modification of the
prevailing test, and could thus be easily implemented. For these reasons, I
recommend that the Supreme Court adopt the MSPT in its forthcoming
opinion.

22
2

Rosch, supra note 3, at 13.
Kesselheim et al., supra note 5, at 1440.
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IV. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, there is a controversy between the circuit courts about the
legality of reverse payment agreements. The Second, Eleventh, and Federal
Circuit Courts regard such agreements as presumptively valid as long as it does
not violate the scope-of-the-patent test. The Third Circuit disagrees with this
approach and finds the agreements prima facie evidence of a restraint on trade.
The Third Circuit subjects the agreements to antitrust scrutiny by way of the
quick look rule of reason analysis.
The Supreme Court heard arguments for and against the scope-of-thepatent test on March 25, 2013. The pending opinion will presumably rule on
the appropriateness of the scope-of-the-patent test as opposed to the quick
look rule of reason analysis.
This Note proposes that the Supreme Court should take into account four
concerns when formulating a response to this issue. First, the protection of the
intellectual property rights of patent holders must be preserved. Second,
competition should be promoted within the pharmaceutical patent industry.
Third, a test should provide assurance of pharmaceutical patent validity in order
to promote competition.
Finally, consumer interest and the cost of
pharmaceuticals should be taken into account in order to provide access to
needed drugs.
This Note also proposes a new test to analyze reverse payment agreements,
called the Modified Scope-of-the-Patent Test. This test takes into account the
aforementioned concerns and tries to find a middle-ground between the stances
of the Second, Eleventh and Federal Circuits and the Third Circuit. It adds a
fourth requirement to the existing scope-of-the-patent test, requiring courts to
engage in a balancing test as to whether the possible anti-competitive effect of
the agreement outweighs the need for protection of intellectual property. For
the above reasons, I recommend that the Supreme Court adopt the Modified
Scope-of-the-Patent Test.
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